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ABSTRACT: Not only have risks become fundamentally unique and unpredictable, they also cannot all be 
anticipated when work is planned. Some risks can only be managed when they occur, by those who are 
facing them on the ground when they occur, most often field operators. These workers must have the 
capacity to identify, analyse and make decisions in order to avoid a deterioration of the situation. However, 
such capabilities are generally expected of managers, rather than field operators. Our working hypothesis 
therefore UHODWHV WR WKLV ³PDQDJHULDOLVDWLRQ´ of technical staff, and what it actually means in terms of 
professionalism and the relationship of both field workers and their supervisors to their work. This paper 
examines the tensions that underlie this managerialisation. It summarises the results of an initial phase of 
exploratory research and presents the theoretical and methodological approaches that will be implemented in 
subsequent work. 
 
I. Introduction  
This paper explores the safety culture and safety 
results of a large company operating in the gas 
sector. Indeed the implementation of numerous 
procedures, practices, trainings, etc. aimed at 
improving risk management and the safety culture 
of the organization has already allowed for 
important progress, but ground for improvement 
remains.  
Our research focuses on the nature of the risks 
faced by the organization and its employees. In 
particular, it looks at operational workers who are 
most exposed to risk and at the measures put in 
place to manage these risks (managerial and 
technical tools, training, awareness-raising 
campaigns, etc.). A review of business practices 
and individual interviews that were carried out 
during an exploratory phase of the project 
established a contradiction between what the 
organisation needs to manage risk and the risk 
management system that has been implemented. 
Indeed the management of fundamentally 
complex and unpredictable risks requires a 
proactive attitude on the part of field workers, 
which enables them to identify, analyse and 
manage risks as they arise. However, the system 
implemented by the organization encourages a 
passive attitude, and reliance on supervisors to 
manage unexpected events. Our working 
hypothesis is that this contradiction between 
active and passive attitudes may explain the 
stagnation LQ WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V VDIHW\
performance and that an analysis of the underlying 
origins may identify drivers for progress.  
This paper presents the results of earlier work that 
led to the identification of this contradiction and 
explores the tensions between active and passive 
attitudes. It first describes the industrial partner 
and the specific target population. It then outlines 
the working hypothesis and presents the results 
obtained during this exploratory phase of the 
project. Finally it presents the theoretical and 
methodological approaches that will be used in the 
next phase of work.  
 
II. Exploratory work  
The industrial partner 
Our research is carried out in partnership with a 
large industrial gas distribution company, which is 
responsible for the delivery of natural gas from the 
transport network to the end-user (households or 
companies).  
To do this, it must maintain nearly 200,000 km of 
pipeline. This involves: monitoring the status of 
the network and carrying out any maintenance 
operations that are necessary to avoid leaks; 
connecting new customers (network expansion, 
installation of regulators, creating connections); 
disconnecting parts of the network (removal of 
connections, regulators, sections of pipeline); and 
finally coordination with other companies whose 
activities may have an impact on gas installations 
(which include pipelines and associated 
equipment, regulators, individual or collective 
connections, storage cabinets, etc.). Such 
companies are typically other network operators 
(electricity, water, telecommunications, etc.), and 
road-building or public construction companies.  
Executing these activities exposes the company to 
µFODVVLFDO¶ occupational risks (everyday risks, 
psychosocial risks, etc.); risks related to its 
construction activities (incidents and accidents 
resulting from technical operations, the use of 
tools, etc.) and risks specifically related to gas 
(fire, explosion, acoustic pressure, etc.). These 
risks may result from the activities of the company 
itself, from its sub-contractors (earthwork 
contractors, technical specialists, etc.) or from 
third parties working in the vicinity of the site.  
The FRPSDQ\¶Vcore business of operating the gas 
distribution network is organised into four 
operational units:  
x Project design and network management;  x Project implementation and maintenance 
operations;  x Organization/planning of human resources; 
and x Management of work carried out by third 
parties (local authorities, operators of water/ 
electricity networks, individual households, 
etc.) in the vicinity of the distribution network.  
These activities are all crucial to gas distribution 
and they cannot be separated when considered 
under an operational perspective. Yet at the 
administrative, financial, human resources and 
even geographical level they are clearly separated.  
The target population  
Our project focuses on only one of these areas, 
namely, project implementation and maintenance 
operations, i.e. the actual execution of work, 
which is both the most technical activity and the 
most directly exposed to industrial and individual 
risk. We chose to focus on this specific activity as 
LWLVWKHRQHFORVHVWWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VKLVWRULFFRUH
business, and because it is the one most directly 
exposed to risk.  
Employees that perform actual work on the 
ground DUHWHUPHG³ILHOGZRUNHUV´RU³RSHUDWLRnal 
ZRUNHUV´. They carry out on-site interventions 
(connection, disconnection, extension, removal, 
modifications, etc. to pipelines) and maintenance 
operations (checks of regulators, network valves, 
etc.).  
The trade initially required strong technical 
competence in plumbing: interviews carried out in 
WKH H[SORUDWRU\ SKDVH VKRZHG WKDW D ³JRRG gas 
technician´was one who had excellent technical 
competence and ³JRWWKHGD\¶VZRUNGRQH´. They 
were expected to know how to execute technical 
operations, on schedule ± the important thing 
being the final result.  
Over the past ten years the trade has undergone 
profound transformations. This is the combined 
result of technical progress, changes in the 
FRPSDQ\¶V business model (in particular an 
increased reliance on outsourcing), much greater 
regulatory pressure and several accidents. The 
latter have left their mark on company culture and 
pushed it to make safety a challenge that is fully 
integrated into the business of gas distribution. 
The main consequences of these changes are:  
x A decline in construction projects requiring 
plumbing or specific gas-related skills, that 
goes hand in hand with an increase in routine 
maintenance requiring fewer technical skills;  x The increasing use of new technologies in the 
field (not only PDAs and telephones but also 
for example, electrofusion welding machines, 
which replace manual welding) and in the 
office, as there is an increase in the amount of 
meta-operational work (Falzon, 1994); x Increased meta-operational work, both in 
terms of procedures and management. More 
time is needed to understand procedures and 
operating modes, to obtain administrative 
authorizations, prepare reports, etc.  
Field workers are under the hierarchical 
responsibility of supervisors KHUH WHUPHG³direct´
RU ³IURQW-OLQH´ supervisors. The function of these 
supervisors is, literally, to supervise the execution 
of work, i.e. brief/debrief field workers, monitor 
the smooth execution of work on the basis of 
paperwork filled out by field workers and manage 
the team (issue sanctions, coordinate absences, 
etc.). Field workers usually turn to them when 
they encounter unexpected situations, especially 
when the problem relates to logistics (lack of 
equipment, transport problems, etc.) or 
administration (a pipe that needs to be excavated, 
work that is running behind schedule, etc.). A 
running joke among supervisors (heard during 
observations and interviews) is that they are the 
³mummies´ RI RSHUDWLRQDO ZRUNHUV ± 
interestingly, one of the few aspects of the trade 
which seems to remain permanent over time and 
can be observed LQ ³DQFLHQW´ZRUNHUV DVZHOO DV
with the younger ones. Finally, it should be noted 
that the role of supervisors is above all 
hierarchical and managerial. Technical 
preparations are the responsibility of other staff, 
known as ³SUHSDUHUV´ ZKR KDYH no hierarchical 
relationship (nor substantial interpersonal 
relationship) with operational staff.  
Therefore, it is these two groups, operational staff 
and their immediate supervisors that lie at the 
heart of our research. Our objective was to 
observe each group individually in order to 
understand the relationship that unites them and 
examine their relationship to risk management. In 
order to achieve this, an exploratory phase based 
on non-participant observation and individual 
semi-structured interviews was implemented.  
Provisional working hypothesis 
Before looking at the operational aspects of gas 
distribution, observation began with a period of 
immersion at the headquarters of the industrial 
partner, which made it possible to quickly become 
familiar with the RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V challenges and 
culture. It offered the opportunity to carry out 
formal and informal interviews with managers and 
technical experts, to take part in meetings, and to 
review documentation related to gas distribution, 
with particular interest for procedures-related 
documents. The immersion was carried out in 
parallel with an initial literature review of the 
concepts most central to the research project, 
including safety culture, risk and management.  
Iterations between empirical observations and 
literature review helped progressively narrow the 
research object and formulate an initial 
hypothesis. This postulates that the 
managerialisation of field workers is essential for 
successful risk management. Managerialisation is 
expected to lead to the restructuring of the trade of 
both gas technicians and their supervisors. It 
suggests that supervisors should partially give up 
their traditional responsibilities, these that will be 
endorsed by field workers directly on the field 
when they manage risk, and instead support teams 
in the development of these new skills.  
The hypothesis was based on a generally accepted 
assumption that risks are now pervasive, 
chronically unpredictable and cannot be fully and 
completely or comprehensively anticipated when 
work is planned (see e.g. Beck, 2001; Pécaud, 
2010; Kermisch, 2011; Mignard and Terssac, 
2011). 
Therefore when unforeseen risks arise in the 
workplace it is up to field workers to identify 
them, analyse their inputs and outputs and take 
appropriate decisions. One of the keys to risk 
management lies in their ability to react quickly to 
avoid a deterioration of the situation (Knegtering 
B., Pasman H.J, 2009). From this perspective, the 
time it takes to call a supervisor (if they can be 
reached) and describe the situation (with a risk 
that something is missed, misunderstood or 
misrepresented) so that someone who is removed 
from the situation can take responsibility for 
making a decision seems both an expensive waste 
of time and inherently risk-bearing (not only for 
the supervisor who must make a decision, but also 
for the field worker who may find themselves 
accused of providing the wrong information). This 
analysis, which forms the basis for our work 
provides a very good illustration of the limitations 
of this mode of operation, as this is how most risk 
situations are currently managed, but it has 
notably failed to reduce the number of incidents 
and accidents.  
Effective risk management is therefore based on 
the ability of field workers to go beyond their role 
of simply carrying out instructions. Instead they 
need to adopt a proactive attitude of active 
attention to their environment, think about context 
analyses and make reasoned decisions. However, 
such attitudes and skills are traditionally expected 
of managers (Mintzberg, 1984), not technicians.  
Methods 
It quickly became clear that non-participant 
observation and semi-structured interviews were 
the best way to test the hypothesis.  
Non-participant observation was chosen for the 
opportunity it provides to experience the social 
reality of the group, its dynamics and to see life as 
it is lived. It avoids the filter of discursive 
constructions and makes it possible to capture 
simultaneously and in all their complexity the 
technical and cognitive practices of agents 
(Arborio & Fournier, 1999; Thiétard, 2007).  
The method involved making direct observations 
of the way in which projects are ³frameG´ at 
briefings (i.e. the information volunteered by the 
supervisor, additional information required by the 
field worker); the behaviour of workers as they 
prepare for work; what happens when they arrive 
on-site; their subsequent behaviour throughout the 
duration of the operation; what provoked 
discussions with colleagues (employees usually 
worked in pairs) and potentially supervisors; the 
nature of these discussions (topics, atmosphere...); 
and the nature of potential constraints that could 
emerge, etc. These practical aspects of the trade 
are difficult to capture during interviews as they 
may be unconscious, forgotten, retrospectively 
distorted, etc.   
In order to minimise biases related to local 
VLWXDWLRQV LH LPSDFW RI DPDQDJHU¶V SHUVRQDOLW\
on the working environment, weigh of a specific 
local history / context, etc.) and in response to a 
request from the industrial partner, this phase 
consisted of the observation of three operational 
sites in three different regions.  
As a complement to direct observations, thirty 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
field workers, direct supervisors, preparers and 
managers (managers have overall responsibility 
for operational sites and their main function is to 
manage front-line supervisors).  
The aim was to gather data on the daily life of 
employees and to develop an understanding of 
how they perceive it. Initially this concerned 
experiences at team level and the identification of 
challenges encountered by individuals within their 
peer group (i.e. by each field worker with respect 
to other field workers, and each supervisor with 
respect to other supervisors), and the challenges 
encountered by each group with respect to the 
other. Secondly, it looked at experiences and the 
risks encountered at a professional level, again 
with the aim of understanding the relationship of 
each group to risk, and to identify any potential 
differences in attitudes to risk between the two 
groups. 
This exploratory phase of the project resulted in 
the collection of an initial dataset and the 
specification of the research hypothesis.  
 
III. Results 
The first phase of field observation supported the 
initial working hypothesis. This postulated that in 
the actual working situation unexpected events 
frequently emerge, which field operators must 
immediately manage if work is not to grind to a 
halt and to prevent risk from deteriorating.  
For example, it is common for ³H[FDYDWLRQV´ (the 
exposed area surrounding the place where work 
on the gas network is carried out) prepared by 
external contractors to be unsafe, usually because 
of surrounding debris (which, according to the 
FRPSDQ\¶V SURFHGXUH should be bagged and 
stored away from the excavation to prevent 
landslides) or pieces of metal that protrude from 
the walls of the excavated area (which can injure 
employees). Other problems include discovering 
once on site that the section of piping on which 
work has to be carried out is not of the 
diameter/material identified during the preparation 
phase and that they are therefore not equipped 
with the proper tools, which obliges workers 
either to collect the correct equipment themselves, 
or to cobble something together with unsuitable 
equipment.  
At first sight such circumstances may not seem 
seriously or inherently risky. However, at a 
minimum they disrupt normal operations and may 
create pressure (stress, shorter deadlines) that 
diverts attention from other risks, thereby 
constituting accident-provoking factors; also in 
the perspective of human & organizational factors 
(Reason, 2013), those are the type of factors that 
may lead to human errors and therefore contribute 
to accidents. Moreover, they require employees to 
mobilise skills such as managing relationships 
with service providers who have prepared the 
excavation (notably if they are still there, to get 
them to improve the situation or to train them in 
order to prevent recurrence), to make trade-offs 
and make decisions (notably regarding time that is 
lost in collecting equipment and in the use of non-
compliant materials).  
Nevertheless, it appears that field workers request 
the help of their supervisors as soon as an 
unforeseen situation is identified. The exceptions 
were a few isolated cases where a supervisor 
could not provide a solution (e.g. when a torque 
wrench required for the installation of a gas meter 
could not be used due to a lack of space around 
the counter). Typically, field workers describe the 
situation to their supervisor and expect to be told 
what to do. In turn, supervisors sometimes decide 
to go and see the situation for themselves ± either 
because they do not trust what has been reported 
to them, or because they deem it necessary to 
resolve the situation in person.  
However, the unpredictability of risks and the 
need to manage them immediately remains a very 
real problem, as demonstrated by the results of the 
first phase of the observation.  
This observation of a discrepancy between what 
seems to be necessary to effectively manage risk 
(i.e. the managerialisation of field workers 
achieved through the development of a proactive 
attitude to their environment and certain cognitive 
skills) and the current practice of remote 
management by supervisors, leads to an 
examination of the reasons for this discrepancy: 
why do field workers, when faced with an 
unexpected situation, prefer to act as spectators 
and operators rather than taking charge of the 
situation?  
IV. Future work: theoretical foundations and 
methodological tools 
Risk management and employee attitudes 
The issue is all the more surprising given the 
mythical gas technician NQRZQ DV ³=RUUR´ ZKR 
emerged from interviews. According to this myth, 
usually evoked with nostalgia (even by the 
\RXQJHU ZRUNHUV ZKR KDYHQ¶W DFWXDOO\ SUDFWLFHG
their trade in such a way), the gas WHFKQLFLDQ¶V 
trade traditionally required a mixture of technical 
expertise, a sense of public service, and courage in 
dangerous situations. This idea has disappeared in 
favour of a picture of the trade that is far more 
formal and sanitised, in which sticking to the rules 
and the precautionary principle take precedence. 
With such a mind-set, it is surprising that gas 
technicians do not seize any opportunity to return 
to more unsophisticated practices.  
Consequently, we turned our attention to how the 
actions of workers are framed by the company 
(prior to, during and after they are executed), and 
how risk is integrated in this framing. This 
brought out the importance, at all stages of the 
project, of the technical and managerial tools used 
to monitor work, either through a priori framing 
or a posteriori reporting. We can only assume that 
the implementation of systematic checks at all 
stages of work ultimately led workers to conform 
to these control procedures, and consequently to 
develop an attitude of passive compliance. 
However, such passivity is inconsistent with the 
proactive attitude that our hypothesis suggests is 
required for effective risk management.  
A further point to note is the way the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V DFWLYLWLHV DUH FXUUHQWO\ set up. 
Current practices mean that field workers are 
issued with a work order without having 
participated in the planning of the work. There is 
therefore no opportunity for them to be consulted 
about technical solutions, constraints, potential 
risks, etc. Although this information is eventually 
made available, it is only after decisions have 
been taken and the project has been tied up. This 
leaves workers in a position where they are unable 
to ask questions and where they are only expected 
to execute specific actions of limited scope.  
This contradiction between the proactive attitude 
required by the nature of risk and the passive 
attitude engendered by the RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V 
managerial and risk management systems helps in 
the identification of the challenges related to risk 
management.  
Theoretical foundations  
At the theoretical level, our hypothesis leads to an 
exploration of two avenues of research, one 
related to the conceptualization of what constitutes 
risk and the other to the rationale for the actions of 
employees.  
Attempts to manage risk through procedures and 
compliance imply that it can be identified and 
supervised prior to any occurrence. This 
presupposes that risk exists in absolute terms (as it 
can be identified, named, categorised, anticipated, 
framed, etc.). However, many theorists (Beck, 
2001; Pécaud, 2010; Mignard and Terssac, 2011; 
Kermisch, 2011; Kouabenan, 2009; Peretti-
Wattel, 2005) agree that risk is an artefact, i.e. that 
it does not exist in itself but only in a specific 
cultural context that identifies it as such. 
Moreover, it appears to be fundamentally 
contingent, in that it RQO\RZHVLWV³H[LVWHQFH´the 
occurrence of something that is initially only a 
possibility) to a specific configuration of events.  
Risk management does not therefore involve 
VROLFLWLQJ WKH ³ULJKW´ UHVponse from employees 
who are faced with risk (i.e. a call to their 
supervisor or the application of the correct rule), 
based on an ultimately linear stimulus > response 
model. Rather LW FRQFHUQV WKH HPSOR\HH¶s ability 
to be alert to their environment and to no longer 
view their working conditions in terms of a 
circumscribed domain (geographically, 
temporally, or technically) but rather as a set of 
dynamic, interacting phenomena, where 
inconsistencies may arise. It is these 
inconsistencies that lead to potential risk that must 
be monitored.  
The prevalent systems¶ perspective that is used to 
conceptualise risk is particularly put to the test by 
the rhizome model (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980). 
This is defined as ³DQ DV\PPHWULF non-
hierarchical system, devoid of meaning (...) 
defined only as changes in states´. The concept 
seems to be a useful heuristic to address a 
complex phenomenon (risk), which is profoundly 
contingent in the sense that it does not have any 
meaning XQWLO LWV PHDQLQJ LV ³GHFLGHG´ by an 
observer at a particular place and time.  
In the same vein, we draw upon the concept of 
³SUDFWLFDO UHDVRQ´ GHYHORSHG E\ Paul 5LF°XU
(5LF°XU, 1986, 1990) $FFRUGLQJ WR 5LF°XU, 
practical reason ³Ldentifies conditions of meaning 
for sensible action, where sensible action is that 
which an agent can understand´Practical reason 
is based on four criteria: motivation, rationale, 
attitudes and practical thinking. It seems 
particularly relevant to the analysis of the actions 
of field workers in their own terms using their 
own configuration and dynamics (and no longer 
simply in terms of their relation to procedures and 
external constraints). At the same time it relates 
these actions to the context (notably 
organisational) in which they originate. As 5LF°XU
argues, practical reason can ultimately be defined 
as ³all measures taken by individuals and 
institutions to preserve or restore the reciprocal 
dialectic of freedom and institutions, without 
which there is no sensible action´  
Given the complexity and specificity of risk-
related action, which forms the basis for  
relationships to work, peer groups, supervisors, 
the company and actions themselves (as ultimately 
risk can turn into an accident), the ULF°XULHQ
concept of practical reason appears to provide 
both an analytical framework for action and a rich 
conceptual framework.  
 
Methods 
Our hypothesis, which postulates that the 
managerialisation of field workers is required for 
risk management, is actually divided into two sub-
hypotheses:  
x Sub-hypothesis 1: the very foundations of 
current risk management tools are unsuited to 
risk management, as they are the result of a 
concept of risk that sees it as an identifiable 
phenomenon that can therefore be framed 
upstream of its occurrence.  x Sub-hypothesis 2: the inadequacy of current 
risk management systems leads field workers 
to develop an attitude of the passive spectator, 
whereas effective risk management requires a 
proactive attitude.  
The hypothesis will be tested in two phases:  
x Further analysis of the RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V risk 
management system (taking into account both 
LWV FRQWHQW DQG LWV ³VKDSHV´ LH ZULWWHQRUDO
form, new technologies, etc.); x Non-participant observation at one of the sites 
that hosted the first phase of observation;  x Identification of successful risk 
management situations in order to 
carry out a more in-depth analysis with 
the actors concerned (via interviews) to 
identify the cognitive mechanisms 
mobilised.  
x An analysis and classification of the 
motivation, rationale and attitudes used 
by field workers in risk management 
activities.  x  
V. Conclusion  
The second phase of the project will be carried out 
over the next nine months. It aims to develop a 
better understanding of what constitutes risk and 
how those employees who are most directly 
affected by these risks (re)act.  
If this objective is achieved, it should be possible 
to improve risk management training for both 
operational staff and to help supervisors improve 
the support they provide to operational teams.  
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